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LEGISLATION
BUDGET CONTROL AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
Recent federal' and state' legislation, prompted by the
exigencies of the times,' strikes a new chord on an old harp, the
doctrine' of the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of government. Heralded from European countries at
one time as a cornerstone of liberty' but recently termed a
"legendary conception",' the theory of the separation of powers
found root in the American federal' and state' constitutions only
to become shorn, in later years, of its broader concepts and dis-
credited as a workable governmental mechanism.' While the doc-
147 STAT. 1517 (1933), 5 U. S. C. Sup. I, §§ 124-132 (1933).
2W. Va. Acts 1933 (First Extraordinary Session) c. 56; Va. Laws 1932,
e. 147, § 30 (dealing with state budget control).
' The act of Congress, supra n. 1, states in its flrst sentence: "The Con-
gress hereby declares that a serious emergency exists by reason of the
general economic depression . . . . " See also Culp, Executivo Power in
Emergencies (1933) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 1066, and a statement by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371
(1932): "The people of the United States are now confronted with an
emergency more serious than war."
IGooDNow, COMPATATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Student's ed. 1893) 20;
WILLIS, PARLIAMENTARY POWERS OP ENGLISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
(1933) 6.
'1 STORY, CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1891) 390, citing comments by Montes-
quieu and Blackstone. But see Pound, Spurious Interpretation (1907) 7
COL. L. REv. 379, 384, where he says: " INo one will assert at present that the
separation of powers . . . . is essential to liberty . . . . it is a practical
device existing for practical ends."
' Suzman, Administrative Law in England (1933) 18 IOWA L. REv. 160, 180,
where he quotes Mr. W. A. Robson, lecturer in Industrial and Administrative
Law at London School of Economics and Political Science, as saying: "The
separation of powers is a legendary conception which has at no period of
English history accurately described the actual division of authority be-
tween the various organs of government."
'U. S. Constitution art. 1, § 1; art. 2, § 1; art. 3, § 1.
'W. Va. Constitution art. 5, § 1. "The Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall
exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any
person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time,
except that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the legislature." See
State v. South Penn. Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 96, 24 S. E. 688 (1896) review-
ing the history of the Virginia constitutions as to separation of powers.
'GOODNOW, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 20, where the author says: " Modern
political science has, however, generally discredited this theory (separation
of powers) both because it is incapable of accurate statement, and because
it seems to be impossible to apply it with beneficial results in the formation
of any concrete political organization." See also Frankfurter, Mr. Justieo
Brandies and the Constitution (1392) 45 RAuY. L. REV. 33, 97, citing excerpts
from the jurist's opinions.
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trine occupies a great space in our constitutional law today,"
economic, social, and industrial complexities" have necessitated
breaking through the strict separation idea with the result that a
much more workable system with a mixture of powers is develop-
ing as in reality was contemplated by the early European
writers.'
The immediate problem involves the delegation of legislative
powers. The maxim" that legislative bodies cannot delegate their
powers is drawn from our constitutions and reiterated by courts
and text writers." At the same time it must be conceded that
many powers formerly exercised by legislatures are now being
exercised by executive or administrative officers, administrative
bodies, and conmissions." This concession may be explained on
two theories:
1. Only administrative powers' of two general classifications
have been delegated: (1) Wherein the legislature by general law
has declared its policy and permits the administrative officer or
body to fill in the details, ' and (2) where the legislature has en-
acted a law to become operative when the executive or administra-
tive officer or body finds certain facts exist."
2"A survey of law review articles and case materials reveal that an enor-
mous consideration is being given various aspects of the doctrine. For one
phase involving many cases see Note (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 424.
"Note (1933) 31 MIoH. L. REv. 786; Ellingwood, The Legality of the Na-
tional Bank Moratorium (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 923. For a ease citation see
State ex rel. 'Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 510,
220 N. W. 929 (1928).
11 STRY, CoNsvruToi, supra n. 4, at 393, where it is pointed out that
Montesquieu and Blackstone really contemplated a mixture of powers in
order to obtain a workable government.
31 COOLEY, CONsTiTuTioN LimiTATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 224 et. seq.
"For a West Virginia opinion on the point see the emphatic language in
State ex. rel. Miller v. Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362, 379 (1884).
"Wickersham, Delegation of Power to Legislate (1925) 11 VA. L. REV. 183;
Note, op. cit. supra n. 11; Note (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 95. See State v.
Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99 N. W. 636 (1904).
"No distinct line separates administrative powers from others. At an early
date Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: "The precise boundary of this power
is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a court will not enter
unnecessarily.'" Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825).
While the administrative law field was surveyed at that early date, the state-
ment seems much like many modern statements of opinions.
Brown, The Executive Department's Exercise of Quasi-judicial and Quasi-
legislative Powers in Wisconsin (1926) 3 Wis. L. REV. 385, 406; Waymanv.
Southard, supra n. 16, at 42, quoted as to the "power to fill up details" in
United States v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 53 S. Ct. 43
(1932). See also Cheadle, Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 892, 899.
"This idea was early set forth by Judge Agnew in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa.
St. 491, 498 (1873); "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state
2
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2. Only those powers have been delegated which could have
been formerly exercised by executive or administrative agencies
but which were commonly exercised by the legislature itself."
With these theories in mind we turn to an act of the West
Virginia legislature directing the governor to maintain a balanced
budget during the years of 1934 and 1935 "in accordance with
the standards" set forth. A mandatory provision' directs that
the governor survey the progress of revenue collections and
determine quarterly the proportion the amount collected bears to
the collections estimated for that period. If as a result of this
survey the governor determines that appropriations to be expended
out of the general revenue cannot be expended without creating
an overdraft or increasing the deficit, he is given authority to
"reduce equally and pro rata all appropriations out of general
revenue in such a degree as may be necessary to prevent an over-
draft in the general fund or an increase in the deficit."'
Does this delegation come under one or both of the classifica-
tions of administrative powers,' or, is it a delegation of delegable
powers of the legislature which may be exercised by an executive
or administrative officer or body!"'' While it may well be argued
that the delegation falls under the latter theory, the West Vir-
ginia court in a very recent decision ' endorses the former view as
applicable to a somewhat similar situation. In that decision the
court says it is well settled that an act may provide
"that it shall become operative only upon some certain act
of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action de-
pend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government." See also
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495 (1892); CooLEY, op. cit. supra n.
13, at 228.
"orweigan Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 53 S.
Ct. 350, 354 (1933), where Mr. Justice Cardozo says: "What is done by the
Tariff Commission and President in changing the tariff rates to conform to
new conditions is in substance a delegation, though a permissible one, of the
legislative process." But see Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 53 S. Ct.
751, 760 (1933) to the effect that "A power definitely assigned by the con-
stitution to one department can neither be surrendered nor delegated by that
department, nor vested by statute in another department or agency." See
also Cheadle, op. cit. supra n. 17, at 893 relative to the non-delegability of
powers assigned.
2' W. Va. Acts 1933 (First Extraordinary Session) c. 56.
Id. § 2.
MId. §§ 3 and .4
' See, as to the definition of this power, n. 16, supra; Note, op. cit. supra
n. 11, at 789.
"See, as to one concept of this delegable power, n. 18, supra. For another
expression of a similar idea, see Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville R. R.
Co. v. Commissioners, I Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
Le Page v. Bailey, 170 S. E. 457 (W. Va. 1933).
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or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be sus-
pended; and the fact of such act or event, in either case,
may be made to depend upon the ascertainment of it by some
other department, body, or officer, which is essentially an
administrative act .... Whether the condition of the financial
affairs of the state demanded a limitation of the activities of
the mining department was a mere matter of accounting -
essentially an administrative act. When that fact was deter-
mined by the Governor, then the actual limitation of the de-
partment was also an administrative, and not a legislative
function. '52
The act' of the West Virginia legislature upheld in the case
cited as to this particular point made it the duty of the governor
to limit certain activities "when in his opinion the financial affairs
of the state government demand." The West Virginia court calls
such a determination "essentially an administrative act."
Since Section 5' of the West Virginia statute under consider-
ation is apparently original, having no parallel so far as it can
be determined in any governmental system, and since it involves
a new idea in the doctrine of the separation of powers, it may well
be quoted as enacted:
"For the purpose of maintaining a balanced budget without
impairing indispensable services, the legislature fixes and
classifies the several objects of expenditures as follows:
Class one: Agencies collecting revenue and administering
the fiscal operations of government, including the offices and
departments of the tax commissioner, auditor, treasurer, and
sinking fund commission.
Class two: Agencies vested with the supervision, control
and direction of executive policy and law enforcement, in-
eluding the governor's office, the attorney general's office, and
the department of public safety.
Class three: State institutions, educational, charitable,
and corrective.
Class four: Other departments and services of the state
government.
Class five: Transfers from the general fund.
The legislature directs the governor in case he determines
I. at 458, construing W. Va. Acts 1933 (Regular Session) c. 1, § 1.
2 It will be noted that in the opinion of Le Page v. Bailey, supra n. 25, the
court expressly points out that it does not pass on the constitutionality of
other delegated powers.
2W. Va. Acts 1933, supra n. 20, § 5.
4
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that the pro rata reduction of appropriations from general
revenue will dangerously impair the existence of those agencies
most essential to the maintenance of government to reduce the
amount to be expended for individual objects of appropriation
as follows:
The first class of appropriations to be reduced shall be
class five, and the preceding classes shall follow in this
order: class four, class three, class two and class one.
All reduction shall be in multiples of five per cent, but a fixed
relationship shall be maintained among the classes which shall
be measured by a difference of five per cent in the rate of
reduction. Class five shall not be reduced more than twenty-
five per cent. The relationship thus to be maintained among
the appropriations as classified shall be according to the table
below:
Classes Five Four Three Two One
(Per cent of 5% ........ ........ ........ ........
reductions 10% 5% ........ ........ ........
from total 15% 10% 5% ........ ........
appropria- 20% 15% 10% 5% ....
tions) .25% 20% 15% 10% 5%"
It will be observed that a survey,' as explained above, to
determine the proportion which revenue collections bear to ap-
propriations planned, is to be followed by a second determination,
whether or not the equal and pro rata reductions will dangerously
impair indispensable government agencies. If the governor de-
termines that the pro rata reduction plan will dangerously impair
governmental functions, he is directed to determine which of the
five graduated rates of reduction set forth in the statute is to be
applied. Does the fact that the legislature has fixed and classi-
fied the objects of expenditure in five classes and has expressly
intended that the governor should administer the budget in ac-
cordance with the scheme, following his determination of the
necessity for such, violate the requirement that matters of discre-
tion which are purely legislative must be reserved for the legisla-
ture ?
Undoubtedly the legislature has declared its policy and in-
tent,' set forth in express language the principles and classifica-
tionse to be followed, and directs, not merely permits, the governor
-Id. § 2.
30 The intent of the act, supra n. 20, may be ascertained from sections 1, 3,
5, and 6, and from the name of the statute, - "An act directing the governor
to maintain a balanced budget."
31W. Va. Acts 1933, supra n. 20, section 5 involves the classifications with
which this study is concerned.
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to administer the state's fiscal affairs accordingly. Concretely to
apply the act, let us suppose that a time arrives in the state's
affairs when by "a mere matter of accounting - essentially an
administrative act -" the governor determines that unless some
reduction is made in appropriations an overdraft will result, and
by another "mere matter of accounting' he determines that a
reduction in appropriations for the revenue collecting agencies
and the executive and public safety departments of classes one
and two, respectively, will seriously impair efficiency. Once such
a determination is made, the governor is directed to reduce, in
accordance with the express will of the legislature, class five ap-
propriations fifteen per cent, class four appropriations ten per
cent, and class three appropriations five per cent.
Again, suppose that three months have passed and, in accord-
ance with the act,' the governor makes another determination, this
time to the effect that financial conditions in the state's affairs
have greatly improved, that situations demanding a high degree
of efficiency in agencies of classes one and two have passed, and
that a pro rata reduction of all appropriations, or even a return
of appropriations to the original figures, is again practical.' It
becomes his duty, not a discretionary right, to administer the
fiscal affairs of the state as directed by the principles and policy
of the legislature's expressed will.
While the statute may well be supported on the ground that
it delegates to the governor delegable legislative powers which
could have been formerly exercised by the legislative or executive
departments, or upon the ground that the legislature has declared
the policy of the law and fixed the standard and it is the adminis-
trative power of the governor which fills in the details, it seems
more consonant with the terms of the statute to say that the legis-
lature has enacted a law to become operative when the governor
determines certain facts exist. In fact it may be said, as to the
five graduated rates of reduction, that five laws have been endorsed
by the legislature, each of whiclh is a purely legislative creation,
and that the governor by administrative acts of accountancy de-
Le Page v. Bailey, supra n. 25, at 458.
mW. Va. Acts 1933, supra n. 20, § 2: "The governor shall examine and
survey the progress of the collection of the revenue and shall determine quar-
terly the proportion which the amount actually collected bears to the collec-
tions estimated for that period."
1Id. § 3. Although it is evident that no express language is used directing
the governor to resume former rates when financial conditions are normal
again, certainly by the quarterly determinations provided for in the act the
implication is strong that such is the intent.
6
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termines which one to apply to administer the fiscal affairs of the
state in accord with the policy of the enactment.
Pertinent here are statements by Professor John B. Cheadle:'
"This administrative field includes all acts legislative in
nature beyond the adoption of the broad policy, so that in
this sense the legislature performs essentially administrative
functions when it works out details in the application of
the policy .. . . All details in the application of the policy
may be delegated, though these details may involve the ex-
ercise of discretion and a choice between policies subordinate
to the broad policy of the legislature.' '"
A Virginia statute,' the predecessor of the West Virginia law
in the pro rata reduction principle, fails to take into consideration
the dangerous impairment of the indispensable governmental
services which will be prevented, to a great degree at least, by
the five graduated rates of reduction for which the West Virginia
act provides. An act of Congress" has recently conferred on the
President very broad powers in the reorganization of executive
and administrative agencies. The President's order' under the
act is not to become final and effective until after Congress has
been in session for sixty days" during which time congressional
disapproval may be made and a change in the order directed."
In view of the West Virginia biennial legislative sessions'3 and a
possible court construction of such a provision that action there-
under, is to be withheld until the legislature has been in session
for a period of time, it is apparent that a provision in the West
Virginia law similar to that of the federal statute would probably
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
6Cheadle, op. cit. supra n. 17, at 899.
"Va. Laws 1932, c. 147, § 30, at page 319: " 'The governor is hereby given
full power and authority to examine and survey the progress of the collection
of the revenue out of which such appropriations may be payable, and to
declare and determine the amounts that can, during each quarter of each of
the fiscal years of the biennium, be properly allocated to each respective
appropriation .... The governor may reduce all of said appropriations pro
rata when necessary to prevent an overdraft or a deficit for the fiscal period
for which such appropriations are made." It will be noted that this statute
as well as the West Virginia statute was enacted only for a period of two
years.
W. Va. Acts 1933, supra n. 20, § 5.
The act of Congress is cited, supra n. 1.
'3The President's first order under the law was issued June 10, 1933. See
5 U. S. C. Supp. I (1933) following § 132.
"5 U. S. C. SUPP. I § 130 (1933).
'3See WILLIs, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 42, 116 et. seq., and 169 for the English
system of Parliamentary approval required for administrative orders.
'3 W. Va. Const. art. 6, § 18.
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render the enactment ineffective for its purpose. Moreover, a
glance at the Virginia act and at the federal statute will convince
one that the West Virginia statute has been much more carefully
drafted" in order to avoid the strict separation of powers limita-
tions of the state constitution.
In looking to the future, one may ask: If this scheme of grad-
uated rates be applied to expenditure of revenues, why may it
not be applied to the receipt of revenues? A sales tax law, for
example, may be drafted wherein the legislature declares its pol-
icy and sets forth standards or principles within which the gov-
ernor or some administrative body might vary the rate of taxa-
tion depending on a determination of the necessity for such. A
gasoline tax, the yield of which will depend largely upon rates
imposed by surrounding states, might thus be varied within limits
in order to yield a maximum potential revenue." Similarly a tax
on liquor sales which may be foreseen under the recent repeal
amendment to the federal constitutione may be varied, following
determinations of policies of control or regulation, so as to make
effective an expressly declared purpose of the legislature. While
in the sales tax situation it may be more difficult at times to spell
out an intelligible principle than in the budget control or tariff
situations," and while taxation strikes more deeply into the sacred
concepts of constitutional government than do other governmental
powers, it seems that such a tax may well be effected in a most
practical manner.
In conclusion it may be said that if the legislature declares
clearly its policy or purpose,' sets forth an intelligible standard
"Attention is to be called to such expressive words as "standard",
"'equally and pro rata", "directs", and similar words which remove an idea
of discretion. The saving features of the law in §§ 8, 9, 10, and 11, W. Va.
Acts 1933, supra n. 20, are commendable.
" See H. B. No. 114, S. B. No. 38, a proposed act of the nature suggested
which was defeated in the Extraordinary Session of the West Virginia legis-
lature in 1933. Section 3 of the proposed act would have allowed the gover-
nor, depending on a determination therein explained, to vary the gasoline tax
between three and six cents on each gallon sold.
" U. S. Const., Amendment 21.
47 J. W. Hampton, Jr., and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348
(1928) construes the tariff act found in 42 STAT. 858, § 315a, at page 941
(1922), 19 U. S. C. §§ 154, 156 (1927), which allows tariff duties to be varied
on a determination by the executive. But of. Fox River Butter Co. v. United
States, 287 U. S. 628, 53 S. Ct. 83 (1933), where a memorandum decision Is
interpreted as meaning approval of a lower court decision (20 C. C. P. A.
Cust. 38) in holding that Congress exceeded its powers in delegating to the
President the power to classify.
" 1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra n. 13, at 228; J. W. Hampton, Jr., and Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. at 405, 48 S. Ct. at 350, cited in n. 47.
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or principle," and reserves to itself matters of wide discretion
which are purely legislative,' other powers necessary to an ad-
ministration of the law may be exercised by executive or adminis-
trative agencies. It is submitted that the West Virginia budget
control law is a practical and workable device& ' of paramount im-
portance in times of financial emergency; that careful drafting
has made it consonant with modern judicial decisions and
thought.'
-STwIEY E. DADismAN.
"Mutual Film Co. v. Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 245, 35 S. Ct. 387 (1915);
J. W. Hampton, Jr., and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409, 48 S. Ct.
348, 352; Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925). But see
State v. Whitman, supra n. 11, where it is difficult to find a standard or principle.
See, as to the standard of "reasonableness", Avent v. United States, 266 U.
S. 127, 45 S. Ct. 34 (1924); Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas Co., 191 N. Y.
123, 128, 83 N. D. 693 (1908). For pertinent language on the standard or
principle required see Mahew v. Nelson, 346 Ill. 38, 178 N. E. 921 (1931).
'WICKERS.A , op. cit. supra n. 13, at 195, where six rules are suggested
as guides to a legislature in drafting a statute in delegating power which will
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Much, the writer intimates, will depend on
the court's own philosophy.
J. W. Hampton, Jr., and Co. v. United States, supra n. 47, reveals the
absolute necessity for such legislation under modern complexities.
'Wheeling Bridge, etc., R. Co. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 144, 19 S. E.
551 (1894); State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 97, 24 S. E. 688
(1896). Also see Le Page v. Bailey, supra n. 25, at 458.
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